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Abstract
This article seeks to test whether African investment treaties present a specific 
approach – i.e. distinct from the North-American and Western Hemisphere – to fair 
and equitable treatment (FET) and (full) protection and security (FPS). The first main 
argument is that the concepts of FET and FPS are not substantially impacted by the 
mere fact of being included in investment agreements to which African States are 
party. The second main argument is that the understanding, interpretation and defini-
tions of these concepts within Africa is not fundamentally different than in other re-
gions. Thirdly, notwithstanding the similarity in the wording of these standards of 
treatment in African investment treaties, there may still be room for taking into ac-
count the specific circumstances of the States in which the investment is made, in-
cluding the level of development of the host State.
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 Introduction
Fair and equitable treatment (FET) without doubt is the most invoked stan-
dard in investment treaty arbitration. Its importance, as a standard of in-
vestment protection, can therefore not be underestimated. While the (full) 
protection and security (FPS) standard is less invoked in isolation of FET, it 
has in the past played an important role in relation to investments affected by 
armed conflict,1 including conflicts in Africa.2
There is a notable and rather neat distinction between the formulation 
of FET and FPS in both North-American investment treaties and ‘Western 
Hemisphere’ bilateral investment treaties (BITs) which are used in European 
States. The latter tend to include FET as a stand-alone standard of treatment, 
while North-American investment treaties, as exemplified inter alia in the 
North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)3 and the US Model BIT 2012,4 
tend to equate FET with the customary norm on the international minimum 
standard of treatment which includes providing (full) protection and security. 
In addition to North-American investment treaties and ‘Western Hemisphere’-
BITs, The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
considered in a 2005 study, that a third approach is found in South-South BITs 
which however differs only limitedly from the preceding two models. This ar-
ticle seeks to test that finding and its relevance today, by investigating whether 
African investment agreements present a specific approach that is distinct 
from the North-American and Western Hemisphere. It will test this hypothesis 
in relation to the FET and FPS standards of treatment.
The main argument of this article is that the concepts of FET and FPS are 
not substantially impacted by the mere fact of being included in investment 
agreements between African and third States. The main reason for this, as I will 
explain, is that African States usually make no use of their own model BIT and 
thus, when negotiating and signing BITs with third States, use is made of the 
model BITs of the European or North-American partner States.
1   Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No ARB/87/3, Final 
Award (27 June 1990) para 50.
2   American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc v Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No ARB/93/1, Award 
(21 February 1997).
3   North American Free Trade Agreement (signed 17 December 1992, entered into force 
1 January 1994) (1993) 32 ILM 289, 606 (NAFTA).
4   US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012) <www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text 
%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf> accessed 17 February 2017.
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As far as intra-African investment agreements are concerned, or South-
South investment agreements, it will be argued that here again little difference 
can be found in the FET and FPS provisions, which not only is linked to the 
same fact that African States usually make no use of their own model BIT, but 
also that they have generally followed the European approach to investment 
treaties and therefore taken over the main provisions of these treaties.
The article’s second argument is that, notwithstanding the relative absence 
of any Africa-specific FET or FPS concepts in BITs, the understanding, inter-
pretation and definitions of these concepts within Africa is not fundamentally 
different than in other regions.
Finally, I will argue that, again notwithstanding the similarity in the wording 
of these standards of treatment, these standards of treatment may be of par-
ticular relevance to African States, and more generally for developing States, 
from a practical perspective since these standards of treatment leave room for 
taking into account the specific circumstances of the host States, including its 
level of development.
I will first explain the main features of the FET and FPS treatment stan-
dards, and their relevance for African investment relations. I will then anal-
yse, based on concluded investment treaties, whether there are Africa-specific 
formulations of the FET and FPS standards, whether there are Africa- 
specific interpretations of these provisions, and thirdly, how FET and FPS 
allow taking into account the specific circumstances of the States in which the 
investment is made, which may be of relevance for African states.
1 The FET and FPS Standards of Treatment
1.1 Overview
FPS, the international minimum standard (IMS) and FET share many fea-
tures. The exact relation between FPS, the IMS and FET is still subject to 
much debate. It has been contented that FPS forms part of the IMS,5 or that 
5   See for a discussion Christoph Schreuer, ‘Full Protection and Security’ (2010) 1(2) JIDS 353. 
See also the decision of the Tribunal in Noble Ventures which argued that ‘[w]ith regard to the 
Claimant’s argument that the Respondent breached Art II (2)(a) of the BIT which stipulates 
that the “Investment shall … enjoy full protection and security”, the Tribunal notes: that it 
seems doubtful whether that provision can be understood as being wider in scope than the 
general duty to provide for protection and security of foreign nationals found in the custom-
ary international law of aliens’, Noble Ventures, Inc v Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/01/11, 
Award (12 October 2005) para 164.
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FET and FPS are included in the IMS.6 Others have contended on the contrary 
that all three standards of treatment are independent treaty standards.7 I do 
not intend to settle these controversies here.
FPS and FET (and IMS) are generally referred to as non-contingent, ab-
solute or objective standards of treatment as opposed to contingent, relative 
or subjective standards, such as national treatment or most favoured nation 
(MFN) treatment.8 The latter category of standards of treatment impose on 
the host State the obligation to act in a certain way by reference to how other 
investors or investments are treated, e.g. national investors or investments 
in case of national treatment, or investors or investments from third States in 
case of MFN treatment. The objective of such standards is that States may not 
discriminate between investors and investments; whether or not the State has 
exercised due diligence in this respect is irrelevant. Objective standards, such 
as FET and FPS, on the other hand require from the State to act in a certain 
‘objective’ way, as required under international law (either custom or treaty 
law) irrespective of how other investors or investments are treated. There is 
in other words no comparison with the treatment of other investors or invest-
ments. This is precisely why, as I will explain in the last Section, FET and FPS 
allow for the taking into account of the specific circumstances of the host State.
The FET standard is a flexible and rather vague concept. However, it is gen-
erally accepted that the legitimate expectations of the foreign investor form a 
key element of FET,9 as are obligations of due process, transparency, freedom 
from coercion and harassment, stability, predictability and a general duty of 
due diligence.10 FET requires at least treatment in accordance with the IMS as 
understood in general international law.11
6    See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Free Trade Commission, ‘Notes 
of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions’ (31 July 2001) <www.sice.oas.org/tpd/
nafta/Commission/CH11understanding_e.asp> accessed 17 February 2017.
7    See Schreuer (n 5) 353.
8    See Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger, International 
Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles (OUP 2008) para 7.19 and Nicolas Angelet, 
‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (OUP 2012) vol III, para 3.
9    Andrew Newcombe and Lluis Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards 
of Treatment (Kluwer Law International 2009) 279.
10   ibid 277; Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law 
of Foreign Investment (OUP 2008) 157 and 186. See also for an overview of the contents 
of the standard in function of arbitral practice Katia Yannaca-Small, ‘Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard: Recent Developments’ in August Reinisch (ed), Standards of 
Investment Protection (OUP 2008) 111, 118 et seq.
11   Newcombe and Paradell (n 9) 277.
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In practical terms, there are roughly four models of FET clauses, except 
for the possibility of course to not include any FET provision at all such as in 
the Australia-Singapore Free Trade Agreement of 2003.12 First, FET can be a 
standalone (unqualified) clause, in that FET is included without any specific 
reference to another treaty standard or to its content.13 Because of their stand-
alone and unqualified character tribunals usually interpret such clauses very 
broadly.14 Secondly, FET can be coupled to the phrase ‘in accordance with in-
ternational law’.15 Such clauses are aimed at ensuring that the interpreter uses 
principles of international law, including, international customary law and 
general principles of law to identify the scope and content of the standard.16 
Thirdly, FET can be equated to the IMS as is the case, for instance, in the 2012 
US Model BIT.17 And fourthly, FET can be used in combination with some 
12   Unless indicated otherwise, all investment treaties referred to here are available at 
UNCTAD, ‘International Investment Agreements Navigator’ <http://investmentpolicyhub 
.unctad.org/IIA> accessed 17 February 2017.
13   See, eg, Agreement between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and the 
Republic of Tajikistan on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(signed 12 February 2009, not yet in force) art 3 (‘All investments made by investors of one 
Contracting Party shall enjoy a fair and equitable treatment in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party’).
14   See, for a discussion, Matthew C Porterfield, ‘A Distinction without a Difference? 
The Interpretation of Fair and Equitable Treatment Under Customary International 
Law by Investment Tribunals’ (Investment Treaty News, 22 March 2013) <www.iisd 
.org/itn/2013/03/22/a-distinction-without-a-difference-the-interpretation-of-fair-and 
-equitable-treatment-under-customary-international-law-by-investment-tribunals/0> 
accessed 17 February 2017.
15   See, eg, Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the 
Government of the Sultanate of Oman on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments (signed 4 May 2004, not yet in force) art 3(2) (‘Investments or returns of in-
vestors of either Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party shall be 
accorded fair and equitable treatment in accordance with international law and provi-
sions of this Agreement.’).
16   UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment (United Nations 2012) 22.
17   US Model BIT (n 4) art 5:
1. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with cus-
tomary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection 
and security.
2. For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law mini-
mum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be 
afforded to covered investments. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and 
“full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that 
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specific substantive content, such as the prohibition of a denial of justice or 
non-discrimination.18
Provisions granting protection and security to investments and investors 
vary in nature. Some treaties refer to ‘full protection and security’, while oth-
ers provide for ‘protection and security’ or ‘constant protection and security’.19 
As explained in regard to FET, it is not the purpose here to engage in a dis-
cussion of these variances. Thus, the standard will be referred to here as FPS 
despite the existing different wordings. Indeed, the current conception of the 
FPS standard of treatment – however phrased – comprises the obligation for 
States to provide physical or police protection to foreign investments and in-
vestors from harm caused by the State itself or by third parties which includes 
the obligations to prevent, punish and apprehend, as well as to possess and 
make available a functioning administrative and legal system to that effect.20 
Some tribunals moreover have argued that the differences in wording do not 
make a substantive difference.21 Also, the use of ‘protection’ rather than ‘pro-
tection and security’ does not change the level of police protection a host State 
is required to provide.22 Besides the requirement of providing physical pro-
tection and security, certain tribunals have, in particular when the word ‘full’ 
precedes ‘protection and security’, extended the application of the standard to 
which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights. 
The obligation in paragraph 1 to provide:
(a) “fair and equitable treatment” includes the obligation not to deny justice in 
criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the 
principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world.
18   See, eg, ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (signed 26 February 2009, en-
tered into force 29 March 2012) art 11:
1. Each Member State shall accord to covered investments of investors of any other 
Member State, fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.
2. For greater certainty:
(a) fair and equitable treatment requires each Member State not to deny justice in 
any legal or administrative proceedings in accordance with the principle of due 
process; and …
19   For an overview and discussion, see Schreuer (n 5).
20   See UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995–2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking 
(United Nations 2007) 132. See also Jeswald W Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties 
(OUP 2010) 132 and 209–10 and George K Foster, ‘Recovering Protection and Security: The 
Treaty Standard’s Obscure Origins, Forgotten Meaning, and Key Current Significance’ 
(2012) 45 Vanderbilt J Transnatl L 1095.
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‘legal protection and security’, making this understanding of the standard in 
fact relatively similar to the FET standard.23 Legal protection and security, in 
certain interpretations, in essence would require States to refrain from taking 
legal or governmental acts or measures that would hinder the proper function-
ing of the investment or would contravene investor’s rights.24 Certain case law 
suggests that FPS requires host States to provide to foreign investors a legal 
framework that guarantees legal protection to investors.25
1.2 The Relevance and Importance of the FET and FPS Standards  
of Treatment
FET without doubt is the most invoked standard in investment treaty 
arbitration,26 and this is not different in disputes involving African States. 
The FET standard thus plays an important role in investment disputes involv-
ing African States. As far as FPS is concerned, and more particularly the FPS 
standard’s physical protection and security component, several African states 
have been confronted to civil strife and armed conflict over the past decades, 
and as a consequence the FPS clause has had27 and has a specific practical 
importance in claims opposing foreign investors to African States. Over the 
past years, States recovering from conflict have been confronted to claims by 
foreign investors for physical damages caused to investments during the con-
flict, or for other non-violent acts, which have decreased the economic value 
23   CME Czech Republic BV v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (13 September 
2001) para 613; Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, AS v The Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No 
ARB/97/4, Award (29 December 2004) para 170; Azurix Corp v The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, Award (14 July 2006) para 408; PSEG Global, Inc, The North 
American Coal Corporation, and Konya Ingin Electrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v 
Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No ARB/02/5, Award (19 January 2007) para 258; Enron 
Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, LP v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, 
Award (22 May 2007) para 323; Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal 
SA v Argentine Republic (formerly Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, SA and Compagnie 
Générale des Eaux v Argentine Republic), ICSID Case No ARB/97/3, Award (20 August 
2007) para 7.4.15; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case 
No ARB/05/22, Award (24 July 2008) para 729; National Grid plc v The Argentine Republic, 
UNCITRAL, Award (3 November 2008) para 189.
24   See, for a discussion, Schreuer (n 5) 358–360 and Newcombe and Paradell (n 9) 311 et seq.
25   Schreuer (n 5) 363.
26   Newcombe and Paradell (n 9) 255.
27   See, eg, American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc v Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No 
ARB/93/1, Award (21 February 1997) and Wena Hotels Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID 
Case No ARB/98/4, Award (8 December 2000).
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of investments.28 It is precisely in view of the various internal armed conflicts 
and civil upheavals that have characterized the African continent over the past 
decades that the application of and respect for the FPS standard in Africa has 
become highly relevant. FPS, coupled or not with FET, indeed has been an 
often invoked provision in investment disputes involving African States, and 
has formed the basis of several decisions establishing breaches of investment 
treaties.29 But the importance of FPS not only lies in its application to acts dur-
ing armed conflict or civil strife. It applies also in non-violent situations and 
has thus been invoked in that context as well.30
2 Are There Africa-Specific Understandings of FET and FPS?
It’s without doubt that FET and FPS may be worded differently, and that there 
is no uniform understanding of both concepts is beyond doubt. Clear dif-
ferences exist between the two main approaches to investment treaties: the 
North-American conceptions of FET and FPS, which tend to equate FET with 
the customary norm on the international minimum standard of treatment, 
and ‘Western Hemisphere’-approach of European States, which tends towards 
standalone FETs or towards combining FET with references to international 
law or some substantive content. UNCTAD however adds a third approach to 
28   In the case of Algeria, for example, which was confronted to guerrilla warfare in cer-
tain parts of its territory since the 2000s, see LESI SpA and ASTALDI SpA v République 
Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, ICSID Case No ARB/05/3, Award (12 November 
2008). In the case of Tunisia, for example, see Lundin Tunisia BV v Republic of Tunisia, 
ICSID Case No ARB/12/30, Award (22 December 2015). Egypt likewise is confronted to 
some 9 claims by foreign investors following the civil unrest in the country over the past 
years, such as Asa International SpA v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/13/23 
(registered 13 September 2013).
29   ibid.
30   In Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v Egypt, for example, the two Claimants 
had, after having learned that their investment was to be seized, requested protection 
of their investment from the Nuweibaa Police. Despite Egyptian Tribunal’s decisions 
that the expropriated investment should be returned to the Claimant because of the 
illegality of the expropriation, Egypt did not restitute the investment to the Claimants. 
The Tribunal thus found Egypt to be in violation of its obligations under the ‘full protec-
tion standard’ as contained in Article 4(1) of the Italy-Egypt BIT, see Waguih Elie George 
Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/05/15, Award 
(1 June 2009) paras 451–56.
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investment treaties, namely the one that can be found in South-South BITs, 
which are close to the European approach.31 According to UNCTAD, South-
South BITs, which includes intra-African BITs, would essentially differ from 
the preceding two models, in that they ‘put more emphasis on exceptions 
(e.g. for balance-of-payments or prudential measures) and the so-called fork-
in-the-road clause.’32 These distinctive features are alien to the standards of 
treatment under consideration here, and as the following overview will show, 
the concepts of FET and FPS are in general not substantially impacted by the 
mere fact of being included in intra-African BITs, nor in BITs concluded be-
tween African States and third States.
2.1 Africa-Specific Formulations of FET and FPS
An analysis of several BITs indicates that African States, when signing BITs 
with third States, do not generally deviate from existing conceptions of FET 
and FPS, in the sense that there does not seem to be any Africa-specific con-
ception of the FET and FPS standards of treatment. The BIT negotiating 
partner’s conception of the standard usually is incorporated in BITs between 
African States and third States. As a consequence, the investment protection 
provisions of investment agreements with African States generally follow the 
traditional BIT provisions in respect of the FET and FPS standards of protec-
tion of foreign investors, with the variations one finds in BITs generally, and 
there does not seem to be any streamlined use of one specific FET or FPS 
provision.
2.1.1 BITs Between African and Non-African States
BITs between European and African States generally follow the model of the 
European partner States, and one thus finds standalone FETs,33 FET linked to 
31   UNCTAD, South-South Cooperation in International Investment Arrangements (United 
Nations 2005) 31.
32   UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004: The Shift Towards Services (United Nations 2005) 
224, Box VI.3.
33   See, eg, Accord entre l’Union économique belgo-luxembourgeoise et le Gabon concernant 
l’encouragement et la protection réciproques des investissements (signed 22 May 2002, 
entered into force 28 May 2005) art 3 (BLEU-Gabon BIT); Accord sur l’encouragement 
et la protection réciproque des investissements entre le Royaume des Pays-Bas et la 
République du Burundi (signed 24 May 2007, entered into force 1 August 2009) art 3 
(Netherlands-Burundi BIT).
  539FET and FPS in African Investment Treaties
Journal of World Investment & Trade 18 (2017) 530–555
international law,34 and FET linked to some substantive content.35 The same 
is true as far as FPS is concerned, BITs that African States have concluded con-
tain the variations one finds in European BITs.36
The situation is not different as far as North-American-African BITs are 
concerned. For example, investment treaties signed between African States 
and the US largely follow the US Model BIT in its successive versions. Thus, 
in accordance with Article II (2) of the 1984 US Model BIT,37 which linked 
FET to international law, the US-Congo,38 US-Egypt39 or US-Tunisia40 BITs 
include an FET clause that also linked it to international law. The more recent 
US-Rwanda BIT follows the 2004 US Model BIT41 linking FET, and FPS to 
the IMS.42 Similar findings can be made as far as Canadian-African BITs are 
34   See, eg, Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République de Madagascar et le 
Gouvernement de la République française sur l’encouragement et la protection récip-
roques des investissements (signed 25 July 2003, entered into force 17 April 2005) art 3.
35   See, eg, Accord entre le Gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc et l’Union économique 
belgo-luxembourgeoise concernant l’encouragement et la protection réciproques des 
investissements (signed 13 April 1999, entered into force 29 May 2002) art 2(1) (BLEU-
Morocco BIT) (linking FET with no discrimination).
36   See, eg, BLEU-Gabon BIT (n 33) art 3 (‘protection et sécurité constants’); Netherlands-
Burundi BIT (n 33) art 3 (‘sécurité et protection physique intégrale’); Agreement between 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Republic of Angola for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(signed 4 July 2000, not yet in force) art 2 (‘full protection and security’); Agreement be-
tween the Swiss Confederation and and the Republic of Botswana on the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments (signed 26 June 1998, entered into force 13 April 
2000) art 4(1) (‘full protection and security’).
37   ‘Text of the US Model Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection 
of Investment of February 24, 1984’ (1986) 4 Berkeley J Intl L 136.
38   Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Zaire Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (signed 3 August 1984, entered 
into force 28 July 1989) art 2.
39   Treaty between the United States of America and the Arab Republic of Egypt Concerning 
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments (signed 11 March 1986, en-
tered into force 27 June 1992) art 2.
40   Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Tunisia Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (signed 15 May 1990, entered 
into force 7 February 1993) art 2.
41   US Model BIT (2004) <www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf> accessed 
17 February 2017.
42   Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment (signed 19 February 2008, entered into force 1 January 2012) art 5.
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concerned. They largely follow Canadian practice in relation to FET and FPS. 
Thus, the recent Canada-Benin BIT of 201343 as well as the Canada-Cameroon44 
and Canada-Nigeria45 BITs of 2014 follow the Canadian approach to FET and 
FPS as embodied in the Canadian Model FIPA, in that the treaties limit FET 
and FPS to what is required under the international customary minimum stan-
dard of treatment.46 Older Canadian-African BITs incorporate an FET clause 
linked to international law.47 Finally, BITs signed between African States and 
other third States, such as China or Singapore, do not contain any specific for-
mulation of FET or FPS either.48
43   Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic 
of Benin for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (signed 9 January 
2013, entered into force 12 May 2014) <http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade 
-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/benin/fipa-apie/index.aspx?lang=eng> 
accessed 17 February 2017 (Canada-Benin BIT).
44   Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Cameroon for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments (signed 3 March 2014, entered into force 16 December 2016) 
<http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
agr-acc/cameroon-cameroun/fipa-apie/index.aspx?lang=eng> accessed 17 February 2017 
(Canada-Cameroon BIT).
45   Agreement between Canada and the Federal Republic of Nigeria for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments (signed 6 May 2014, not yet in force) <http://international 
.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/nigeria/ 
fipa-apie/index.aspx?lang=eng> accessed 17 February 2017.
46   ibid, art 6; Canada-Benin BIT (n 43) art 7; Canada-Cameroon BIT (n 44) art 6.
47   See, eg, Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the 
Government of Canada for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (signed 
27 November 1995, not yet in force) art 2; Agreement between the Government of Canada 
and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (signed 13 November 1996, entered into force 3 November 1997) art 2.
48   Chinese-African BITs largely have adopted the standalone FET clause. See, eg, 
Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the 
Government of the Republic of Ghana Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments (signed 12 October 1989, entered into force 22 November 1990) 
art 3; Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the 
Government of the Republic of Benin Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments (signed 18 February 2004, not yet in force) art 2; Agreement 
between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the 
Syrian Arab Republic concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(signed 9 December 1996, entered into force 1 November 2001) art 3. See also Agreement 
between the Government of the Republic of Mauritius and the Government of the 
Republic of Singapore (signed 4 March 2000, entered into force 19 April 2000) art 2(2) 
(containing a standalone FET clause).
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The main explanations for the absence of a specific formulation of FET and 
FPS in African investment treaties are, first – and I admit the circularity of the 
argument – that there is, perhaps, no specific understanding of FET and FPS 
in the investment policies of African States. Secondly, many African States do 
not have a model BIT which could be used for negotiations. As a consequence, 
in the context of investment treaty negotiations between African States and 
Canada or the US, African States have a tendency to ‘simply’ sign up to the 
model used by the respective other State. In other words, in many cases the 
model treaty is simply signed with little, if any, modifications to the FET and 
FPS clauses used in the models of the BIT partner States. The Canada-Benin 
BIT negotiations are a good example to highlight this circumstance. In fact, 
the negotiations lasted only a few months,49 and the final treaty text is very 
close to the Canadian Model FIPA.50 Rather exceptional are the recent ne-
gotiations between Canada and Burkina Faso that lasted almost two years – 
from August 2012 to May 2014 – and the parties have not yet signed the final 
text of the investment treaty.51
2.1.2 Intra-African BITs
Intra-African BITs which have effectively entered into force are a rather rare 
species, the majority of the BITs concluded with African States being in-
deed North-South BITs. Overall, the majority of intra-African BITs follow the 
European approaches to FET and FPS, and therefore one finds variations to 
FET and FPS in intra-African BITs.52 At the same time, in respect to FPS, 
49   For a discussion, and criticism, see Lorenzo Cotula, ‘Is the Tide Turning for Africa’s 
Investment Treaties?’ (International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), 
8 March 2013) <www.iied.org/tide-turning-for-africa-s-investment-treaties> accessed 
17 February 2017.
50   ibid.
51   See Government of Canada, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, ‘Canada-
Burkina Faso Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement’ <http:// 
international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/
burkina_faso/fipa-apie/background-contexte.aspx?lang=eng> accessed 17 February 2017.
52   See, eg, Convention entre le Gouvernement de la République Arabe d’Egypte et le 
Gouvernement de la République Centrafricaine sur l’encouragement et la protection 
réciproques des investissements (signed 7 February 2000, not yet in force) art 2 (Egypt-
Central African Republic BIT) (standalone FET); Accord entre le Gouvernement du 
Burkina Faso et le Gouvernement de la République du Benin concernant la promotion 
et la protection réciproque des investissements (signed 18 May 2001, not yet in force) art 
2(1) (Burkina Faso-Benin BIT) (standalone FET); Agreement between the Government of 
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ehtiopia and the Government of the Republic of the 
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one finds – besides general FPS clauses-53 treaties containing no FPS clause,54 
FPS clauses connected to international law,55and the inclusion of references 
to the fact that FPS standard does not apply to ‘measures necessary to main-
tain public order.’56 Such clauses are moreover not limited to intra-African 
BITs and one finds them in several other treaties signed between European 
and African States, in particular treaties signed by the Belgian-Luxembourg 
Economic Union (BLEU).57
Here again little difference can be found in the FET and FPS provisions, 
which is not only linked, again, to the fact that African States usually make no 
use of their own model BIT, but also to the fact that African States have gener-
ally followed the European approach to investment treaties and have therefore 
taken over the main provisions of these treaties.58 Based on this BIT practice, 
the understanding, interpretation and definitions of FET and FPS within 
Africa seem consequently not to be fundamentally different than in other 
regions.
Sudan on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment (signed 7 March 2000, 
entered into force 15 May 2001) art 3 (FET followed by a national treatment and MFN 
clause); Accord entre le Gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc et le Gouvernement de la 
République du Cameroun sur l’encouragement et protection réciproques des investisse-
ments (signed 24 January 2007, not yet in force) art 2 (Morocco-Cameroon BIT) (FET 
linked to international law).
53   Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République du Cameroun et le Gouvernement de la 
République Arabe d’Egypte relatif à la promotion et la protection réciproques des inves-
tissements (signed 24 Octobre 2000, not yet in force) art 4.
54   See, eg, the Burkina Faso-Benin BIT (n 52) or the Switzerland-Benin BIT of 1966.
55   Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Benin Concerning 
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Capital Investment (signed 29 June 1978, en-
tered into force 18 July 1985) art 3.
56   See, eg, Morocco-Cameroon BIT (n 52) art 2; Egypt-Central African Republic BIT (n 52) 
art 2.
57   See, eg, Accord entre la République du Benin et l’Union économique belgo-luxembour-
geoise concernant l’encouragement et la protection réciproques des investissements 
(signed 18 May 2001, entered into force 30 August 2007) art 3(2); Agreement between the 
Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union and the Government of the Republic of Belarus on 
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (signed 9 April 2002, not yet in 
force) art 3(2).
58   UNCTAD (n 32) 224, Box VI.3.
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2.1.3 Regional African Investment Agreements and the SADC  
Model BIT
Contrary to the majority of the intra-African BITs, some regional African in-
vestment agreements do indicate an Africa-specific understanding of FET and 
FPS. However, not all African regional free trade agreements contain substan-
tive investment protection provisions. The Treaty for the Establishment of the 
East African Community (EAC) from 1999 for instance contains commitments 
by which States parties agreed to adopt measures to achieve the free move-
ment of persons and services, but does not contain substantive investment 
protection provisions. In those regional agreements, which include an FET 
or FPS provision, such as the COMESA Agreement59 or the SADC Protocol 
on Finance and Investment,60 these FET and FPS clauses do not indicate any 
specific deviance from the general formulations one finds in other investment 
agreements.
However, over the past years, certain African investment agreements show 
specific features in relation to FET and FPS, which may be seen as heralds 
of a possible specific African conception of these standards. The most impor-
tant example here is the Investment Agreement for the COMESA61 Common 
Investment Area,62 which however has not entered into force. This treaty, 
first of all, has no FPS clause. Secondly, the agreement has a very specific FET 
clause, phrased as follows:
ARTICLE 14 – Fair and Equitable Treatment
1. Member States shall accord fair and equitable treatment to COMESA 
investors and their investments, in accordance with customary interna-
tional law. Fair and equitable treatment includes the obligation not to 
59   Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (signed 
5 November 1993, entered into force 8 December 1994) art 159 (‘Investment Promotion 
and Protection’) (‘1. In order to encourage and facilitate private investment flows into the 
Common the Market, Member States shall: (a) accord fair and equitable treatment to 
private investors’).
60   SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment (signed 18 August 2008, entered into force 
16 April 2010, version before the amendments of August 2016) art 6 <www.sadc.int/
files/4213/5332/6872/Protocol_on_Finance__Investment2006.pdf> accessed 17 February 
2017.
61   COMESA Member States are Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DR Congo), Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
62   Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area (signed 23 May 2007, 
not yet in force).
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deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings 
in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the princi-
pal legal systems of the world.
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article prescribes the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard 
of treatment to be afforded to covered investments and does not require 
treatment in addition to or beyond what is required by that standard.
3. For greater certainty, Member States understand that different Member 
States have different forms of administrative, legislative and judicial sys-
tems and that Member States at different levels of development may not 
achieve the same standards at the same time. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this 
Article do not establish a single international standard in this context.
The first two paragraphs are reminiscent of a definition one regularly finds in 
US and Canadian BITs, as well as in the NAFTA,63 and thus signal adherence 
to a rather strict approach to FET. In that respect, one may argue that since 
the customary international minimum standard includes physical protection 
and security, the absence of a specific FPS clause in the COMESA Investment 
Agreement has no influence on the application of the customary physical pro-
tection and security standard. The third paragraph of the COMESA Investment 
Agreement however is interesting, since it includes a rather uncommon provi-
sion, which introduces a link between respecting the FET standard and the 
level of development of host State.64 This idea is not entirely new. As I will 
explain in the final Section of this article, there has generally been a discussion 
on the question of whether the level of development of the host State may 
be taken into account when assessing what investors can expect as treatment 
from the host State.65 While the idea thus already exists, it is rather uncommon 
63   NAFTA (n 3) art 1105 (‘Minimum Standard of Treatment’): ‘Each Party shall accord to 
investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, 
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security’. The NAFTA Free 
Trade Commission has interpreted this provision as follows: ‘Article 1105(1) prescribes the 
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum 
standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party. (2) The 
concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not re-
quire treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary inter-
national law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.’ (NAFTA Free Trade Commission 
(n 6) s B(1)–(2)).
64   UNCTAD (n 16) 34.
65   See infra pt 3.
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to have such a provision in an investment agreement, and to that effect, it does 
indicate a special approach to the FET and FPS standard.
The SADC Model BIT66 also provides for a specific approach, not only on 
BITs in general, but more specifically on FET and FPS provisions. However, 
this model has not yet been used in practice. The SADC Model BIT takes again 
a rather strict approach to FET, and contains two options. The first one links 
FET to the customary IMS – in line with the US and Canadian practice – but 
contains in its second paragraph a definition of that customary IMS which 
incorporates almost verbatim the Neer formulation of that standard:67
Article 5: Option 1: Fair and Equitable Treatment
5.1. Each State Party shall accord to Investments or Investors of the other 
State Party fair and equitable treatment in accordance with customary 
international law on the treatment of aliens.
5.2. For greater certainty, paragraph 5.1 requires the demonstration of an 
act or actions by the government that are an outrage, in bad faith, a wilful 
neglect of duty or an insufficiency so far short of international standards 
that every reasonable and impartial person would readily recognize its 
insufficiency.
The Commentary to the SADC Model BIT is very informative in this respect. 
It states that the first option is ‘based on the traditional fair and equitable 
treatment (FET) provision common to many BITs.’68 The explicit reference to 
the Neer formulation here is intended to ‘be more specific and precise in the 
66   South African Development Community, ‘SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Template with Commentary’ (2012) <www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/
SADC-Model-BIT-Template-Final.pdf> accessed 17 February 2017 (hereinafter: SADC 
Model BIT).
67   The United States-Mexico General Claims Commission described the IMS as follows in 
LFH Neer and Pauline Neer (USA) v United Mexican States, Decision (15 October 1926) 
(1951) IV UNRIAA 60, 61–62):
the propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of international stan-
dards, and (second) that the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an interna-
tional delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to willful neglect of 
duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international stan-
dards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insuffi-
ciency. Whether the insufficiency proceeds from deficient execution of an intelligent 
law or from the fact that the laws of the country do not empower the authorities to 
measure up to international standards is immaterial.
68   SADC Model BIT (n 66) 23.
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standard to be applied’, and counters the fact that explicit references to cus-
tomary international law generally, or the customary international law stan-
dard of treatment of aliens have not ‘sufficed to restrain arbitrator creativity 
in this regard.’69
Option 2 is even narrower being limited to ‘Fair Administrative Treatment’, 
and denial of justice only:
Article 5: Option 2: Fair Administrative Treatment
5.1. The State Parties shall ensure that their administrative, legislative, 
and judicial processes do not operate in a manner that is arbitrary or that 
denies administrative and procedural [justice][due process] to investors 
of the other State Party or their investments [taking into consideration 
the level of development of the State Party].
5.2. Investors or their Investments, as required by the circumstances, shall 
be notified in a timely manner of administrative or judicial proceedings 
directly affecting the Investment(s), unless, due to exceptional circum-
stances, such notice is contrary to domestic law.
5.3. Administrative decision-making processes shall include the right of 
[administrative review] [appeal] of decisions, commensurate with the 
level of development and available resources at the disposal of State 
Parties.
5.4. The Investor or Investment shall have access to government-held 
information in a timely fashion and in accordance with domestic law, 
and subject to the limitations on access to information under the appli-
cable domestic law.
5.5. State Parties will progressively strive to improve the transparency, 
efficiency, independence and accountability of their legislative, regu-
latory, administrative and judicial processes in accordance with their 
respective domestic laws and regulations.
In relation to the second option, the Commentary to the SADC Model BIT 
states that this ‘is an alternative formulation that would be a new approach to 
addressing key issues in a more restricted and careful manner than the FET 
text.’70 It is explicitly formatted as a reaction to the broad interpretations of 
FET provisions in other treaties, and aims at removing the discretion left to 
arbitrators to decide what FET means: ‘the language on FET presented here 
69   ibid.
70   ibid 23–24.
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is the least likely to lead to mischief through expansive interpretations by 
arbitrators.’71
As far as FPS is concerned, the SADC Model BIT is interesting since it cou-
ples FPS with the national treatment and MFN treatment standards. Article 9 
provides that
9.1. A State Party shall accord Investments of Investors of the other 
State Party protection and security no less favourable than that which it 
accords to investments of its own investors or to investments of investors 
of any third State.
9.2. Investors of one State Party whose Investments in the territory of the 
other State Party suffer losses as a result of a breach of paragraph 9.1, in 
particular owing to war or other armed conflict, revolution, revolt, insur-
rection or riot in the territory of the Host State shall be accorded by the 
Host State treatment, as regards restitution, indemnification, compen-
sation or other settlement, no less favourable than that which the Host 
State accords to investors of any third State.
As the Commentary also indicates, this approach is not extraordinary, and 
one finds such formulations of FPS in many other investment agreements,72 
also in relation to the FET standard.73 In essence, despite being promoted as a 
stand-alone clause,74 the protection and security clause does not seem to add 
anything substantial to an FPS clause limited to physical protection. An MFN 
clause generally is missing in the SADC Model BIT, based on the consider-
ation that ‘these should be bilateral treaties and that, as such, they should not 
establish unintended multilateralization through the MFN provision.’75
71   ibid.
72   ibid 29.
73   See, eg, Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République du Cameroun et le Gouvernement 
de la République Populaire de Chine pour la promotion et la protection réciproques des 
investissements (signed 10 May 1997, entered into force 27 July 2014) art 3 <http://dev 
.arbitration.org/sites/default/files/bit/cameroon_china_french.pdf> accessed 17 February 
2017.
74   SADC Model BIT (n 66) 29.
75   ibid 22. The Commentary nevertheless mentions that if States should wish to include an 
MFN provision, it suggests it to be drafted as follows:
4.2. Most Favoured Nation Treatment: Subject to paragraphs 4.4–4.6, each State Party 
shall accord to Investors and their Investments treatment no less favourable than the 
treatment it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any other State and their 
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More recently, SADC Member States have adopted certain important 
changes to the SADC Finance and Investment Protocol76, and notably to its 
Annex 1 which contains the investment protection standards. The changes 
as such have not (yet) been made public.77 The main change relevant for this 
article relates to Article 6.1 of Annex 1, which granted investors fair and equi-
table treatment. The FET standard has been removed and apparently replaced 
by a clause providing instead for national treatment.78 National treatment 
moreover is subjected to preferential treatment for local investors in case of 
domestic legislation adopted to further ‘national development objectives’.79 
The amended protocol has not yet been ratified, but the changes brought 
to the text may be seen, as is the case with the SADC Model BIT discussed 
above, as heralding a new direction for African – or more broadly for (develop-
ing) countries which are dissatisfied with the current investment protection 
standards – approaches to investment protection.
2.2 Africa-Specific Interpretations of FET and FPS
One may nonetheless question whether, notwithstanding the relative similar-
ity in wording of the FET and FPS standards of treatment in BITs between 
African States and third States, African States have a different understanding 
of FET or FPS. This does not appear to be the case.
First of all, and this is the most important consideration, if African States 
had intended FET or FPS to mean something different than what is regularly 
understood by these standards in their different formulations, African States 
would have made it clear in the text of their treaties directly. Besides the just 
mentioned exceptions in the COMESA Investment Agreement – which has 
not entered into force – and the SADC Model BIT – which has not yet been 
investments with respect to the management, operation and disposition of 
Investments in its territory.
76   SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment (signed 18 August 2006, entered into force 
16 April 2010) <www.sadc.int/files/4213/5332/6872/Protocol_on_Finance__Investment 
2006.pdf> accessed 22 February 2017.
77   This paragraph is based on the report by Luke E Peterson, ‘Investigation: In Aftermath 
of Investor Arbitration Against Lesotho, SADC Member-States Amend Investment 
Treaty so as to Remove ISDS and Limit Protections’ (IAReporter, 20 February 2017) 
<www.iareporter.com/articles/investigation-in-aftermath-of-investor-arbitration-against 
-lesotho-sadc-member-states-amend-investment-treaty-so-as-to-remove-isds-and-limit 
-protections/> accessed 22 February 2017.
78   ibid.
79   ibid.
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used in practice –, no different understanding has been noticeable from any of 
the treaty texts that presented in Section 2.1 here above. It is thus difficult to 
argue that, absent any additional indication in the treaty text or in the negotia-
tion documents, an identically drafted provision would have a different mean-
ing only because a State from a different continent is signatory to that treaty.
Second, statements made by African governments in arbitral proceedings 
do not indicate that FET or FPS have any specific or different meaning in the 
African continent. Indeed, arguments raised by States during arbitral proceed-
ings by definition have a tendency to weaken the value and legal implications 
of the protection standards, and this is no different from one continent to an-
other.80 This is, indeed, a question of litigation strategy rather than an indica-
tion of a different understanding of FET and FPS.
Third, arbitral tribunals usually interpret FET provisions without any spe-
cific geographical consideration. Reference is made to other tribunals’ inter-
pretation of the provision in disputes and no consideration is given to the 
question whether the parties to the cited decision are in fact geographically 
linked to the parties to the dispute at stake.81
3 Contextualizing FET and FPS in Africa
3.1 FET and the Legitimate Expectations of Foreign Investors
As explained under Section 1, FET is a flexible and rather vague concept. 
Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that the legitimate expectations of the 
foreign investor form part of FET.82 What constitutes ‘legitimate expectations’ 
is again subjected to diverse interpretations, covering expectations resulting 
from the host State’s conduct in respect of commitments or representations 
made by the State, expectations of a certain stability and predictability in 
80   See for a discussion and examples: Lise Johnson, ‘Ripe for Refinement: The State’s Role 
in Interpretation of FET, MFN, and Shareholder Rights’ GEG Working Paper 2015/101 
(April 2015) <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/GEG-WP_101-Ripe-for-Refinement-The 
-States-Role-in-Interpretation-of-FET-MFN-and-Shareholder-Rights-Lise-Johnson_0 
.pdf> accessed 21 February 2017.
81   See, eg, Biwater Gauff v Tanzania (n 23) paras 524–33 and Jan de Nul NV and Dredging 
International NV v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/04/13, Award (6 November 
2008) paras 185–94.
82   Newcombe and Paradell (n 9) 279.
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the legal and administrative framework of the host State, and the general – 
circular – expectation of a fair and equitable conduct by the host State.83
As was shown in the previous Section, Article 14 (3) of the COMESA 
Investment Agreement contains a provision to the effect that FET is made 
dependent on the level of development of the host State. Besides the inclu-
sion in a treaty of such a provision, one may validly argue that the legitimate 
expectations of foreign investors differ according to whether the investment is 
made in a developed or in a developing State, and that as a consequence the 
application of the FET standard, at least as far as the expectations of investors 
are concerned, is necessarily linked to the specific level of development of the 
host State. This is of course not limited to African States.
First, FET must be appreciated in concreto taking into account the specific 
circumstances of each case, both from a factual and from a contextual perspec-
tive.84 As one author puts it, ‘the subjective element is the flesh that covers 
the carcass of the standard, giving it life. It is only when the FET standard is 
applied to a specific case that it becomes alive.’85 Application of the FET stan-
dard should thus not only depend on the specific facts of the case, but more 
importantly on the circumstances and the context in which the investment 
was made. The latter assessment criterion includes the political and economic 
situation of the host State. Although this will be more visible in relation to the 
FPS standard because of the application of the due diligence standard, as I will 
explain in the next Section, there is no reason to exclude the influence of the 
level of development of the host State in relation to the FET standard. In this 
context, I should also point out that investors should act with due diligence in 
making the investment.86 The idea is a corollary to the mentioned principle 
that the legitimate expectations of foreign investors differ according to wheth-
er the investment is made in a developed or a developing State.
Case law in this respect however is limited. The Tribunal in Parkerings, for 
instance, noted that the foreign investor has
83   For a discussion, see ibid 279  et seq.
84   ibid 278. See also, amongst others, Jan de Nul NV (n 81) para 185.
85   Tudor (n 10) 127. See also Ronald S Lauder v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award 
(3 September 2001) para 292. However, the use here of the notion ‘subjective’ may be mis-
leading as it implies that the arbitrator’s decision on what is fair and equitable is based 
only on the arbitrator’s personal perception thereof, while it is beyond doubt that what 
fair and equitable treatment is should be based on legal reasoning through the interpreta-
tion of the relevant applicable investment treaty and general international law.
86   Tudor (n 10) 216.
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a right to a certain stability and predictability of the legal environment of 
the investment. The investor will have a right of protection of its legiti-
mate expectations provided it exercised due diligence and that its 
legitimate expectations were reasonable in light of the circumstances. 
Consequently, an investor must anticipate that the circumstances could 
change, and thus structure its investment in order to adapt it to the 
potential changes of legal environment.87
In the same vein, the Tribunal in Biwater Gauff explained
Protection of legitimate expectations: the purpose of the fair and equi-
table treatment standard is to provide to international investments treat-
ment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into 
account by the foreign investor to make the investment, as long as these 
expectations are reasonable and legitimate and have been relied upon by 
the investor to make the investment.88
The Tribunal in Eudoro Armando Olguín v Republic of Paraguay explained in 
relation to claims for violation of the FET standard and an expropriation claim 
that
This Tribunal does not accept Mr. Olguín’s contention that he was 
induced to make his investment by the bulletins issued by the Central 
Bank of Paraguay. To the contrary, the Tribunal feels that prudence would 
have prompted a foreigner arriving in a country that had suffered severe 
economic problems to be much more conservative in his investments.89
3.2 FPS and the Due Diligence Requirement
Due diligence is present in a variety of aspects of the protection of foreign in-
vestors in international investment law. In the current conception of the FPS 
standard, the host state is in breach of its international obligation to guaran-
tee FPS, if it fails to exercise due diligence in taking all necessary measures in 
order to provide physical and security protection to the foreign investor from 
87   Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Lithuania (n 21) para 333.
88   Biwater Gauff v Tanzania (n 23) para 602 (emphasis added).
89   Eudoro Armando Olguín v Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No ARB/98/5, Award (26 July 
2001) para 75.
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harm cause by third parties.90 Although FPS is often not further defined, it 
is the general understanding of the content of the standard that it requires 
the State to exercise due diligence. In Lauder v Czech Republic, for instance, the 
Tribunal noted that
Article II (2) (a) of the Treaty provides that ‘[i]nvestment … shall enjoy 
full protection and security’. There is no further definition of this obliga-
tion in the Treaty. The Arbitral Tribunal is of the opinion that the Treaty 
obliges the Parties to exercise such due diligence in the protection of for-
eign investment as reasonable under the circumstances. However, the 
Treaty does not oblige the Parties to protect foreign investment against 
any possible loss of value caused by persons whose acts could not be 
attributed to the State. Such protection would indeed amount to strict 
liability, which can not be imposed to a State absent any specific provi-
sion in the Treaty.91
The host State thus holds no strict liability for such harm.92 A host State should 
thus take all measures that it could reasonably be expected to take in order to 
prevent the occurrence of damages to the foreign investor and its investment.93 
The same principles apply to host State’s obligations in case of armed conflict, 
civil strife, revolution or natural disasters.94 A host State should then use ‘the 
police and military forces to protect the interests of the alien to the extent 
feasible and practicable under the circumstances, both before the event and 
while it unfolds.’95
Certain authors have argued that international law adheres, generally, to 
the diligens paterfamilias standard.96 In his 1955 Hague Academy Lecture, 
Freeman noted that the standard of due diligence requires ‘nothing more nor 
less than the reasonable measures of prevention which a well-administered 
90   See references in n 20.
91   Lauder v Czech Republic (n 85) para 308.
92   Salacuse (n 20) 132 and 209–10. See also Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v Republic of Sri 
Lanka, ICSID Case No ARB/87/3, Final Award (27 June 1990) para 77.
93   Salacuse (n 20) 217.
94   Newcombe and Paradell (n 9) 336, para 13.4.
95   Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 
2008) 166.
96   Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, ‘The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International 
Responsibility of States (1992) 35 German YB Intl L 41.
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government could be expected to exercise under similar circumstances.’97 This 
is an ‘objective’ assessment criterion.
The objective standard has however been rejected by several scholars and 
arbitrators, which have instead relied on the ‘subjective due diligence standard’, 
taking into consideration the means that are at the disposal of the host State, 
as well as the specific circumstances present in the host State.98 In assessing 
the due diligence standard, Brownlie supports the application of the diligentia 
quam in suis standard, rather than the diligens pater familias standard,99 ar-
guing that the applicable standard is the standard ordinarily observed by the 
particular State in its own affairs, which means that variations in the wealth 
between States can be taken into account.100 This is in line with the applica-
tion of the principle of other fields of international law, such as internation-
al environmental law. The International Law Commission (ILC), in its Draft 
Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, for 
instance, consider that the ‘economic level of States is one of the factors to be 
taken into account in determining whether a State has complied with its obli-
gation of due diligence’, in relation to States’ obligation of prevention, noting 
at the same time that ‘a State’s economic level cannot be used to dispense the 
State from its obligation.’101
Also, more recent cases suggest that the applicable standard is a subjective 
due diligence standard. In Lauder v Czech Republic, the Tribunal considered 
that the FPS obligation ‘obliges the Parties to exercise such due diligence in the 
protection of foreign investment as reasonable under the circumstances.’102 In 
CME v Czech Republic, the Tribunal also explained that ‘a government is only 
obliged to provide protection which is reasonable in the circumstances.’103 Sole 
arbitrator Jan Paulsson in Pantechniki v Albania also unambiguously adopted 
the subjective assessment method, distinguishing ‘physical protection and se-
curity’ from ‘denial of justice’, the latter not requiring to take into account the 
resources of the State, but the former allowing to take account of the resources 
of the State:
97   Alwyn V Freeman, ‘Responsibility of States for Unlawful Acts of Their Armed Forces’ 
(1955–II) 88 Recueil des Cours 263, 277–78.
98   See, for an overview, Newcombe and Paradell (n 9) 310, para 6.44.
99   Pisillo-Mazzeschi (n 96) 41.
100   Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn, OUP 2008) 526.
101   International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm 
from Hazardous Activities’ (2001) UN GAOR 56th Session Supp No 10, UN Doc A/56/10, 
Commentary to art 3, para 13.
102   Lauder v Czech Republic (n 85) para 308 (emphasis added).
103   CME Czech Republic BV v Czech Republic (n 23) para 353 (emphasis added).
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A failure of protection and security is to the contrary likely to arise in an 
unpredictable instance of civic disorder which could have been readily 
controlled by a powerful state but which overwhelms the limited capaci-
ties of one which is poor and fragile. There is no issue of incentives or 
disincentives with regard to unforeseen breakdowns of public order; 
it seems difficult to maintain that a government incurs international 
responsibility for failure to plan for unprecedented trouble of unprec-
edented magnitude in unprecedented places. The case for an element of 
proportionality in applying the international standard is stronger than 
with respect to claims of denial of justice.104
 Conclusion
FET and FPS constitute, from a substantive perspective, important protection 
standards in investment agreements, both generally and specifically in Africa 
investment relations.
In addition to North-American investment treaties and ‘Western 
Hemisphere’-BITs which are used by European States, UNCTAD considers a 
third approach found in South-South BITs, which however differs from the 
preceding two models in other aspects than the standards under consideration 
here. Based on these starting points, this article’s main attempt has been to in-
vestigate whether African investment agreements present a specific approach 
to FET and FPS in international investment agreements.
This article has argued that treaty practice, between African States and third 
States as well as between African States, shows no different conception of FET 
or FPS, in the sense that a specific African model would exist. It has, on the 
contrary been shown that in BITs between African and third States, the used 
FPS and FET clauses depend very much on the contracting third State, and in 
relation to intra-African BITs that they reflect the FET and FPS clauses usually 
found in European BITs.
The main explanations for the absence of a specific formulation of FET 
and FPS in African investment treaties are first, the absence, of a specific un-
derstanding of FET and FPS in the investment policies of African States, and 
secondly, the absence of African States’ model BITs which are used for negotia-
tions. Besides the mentioned exceptions in the recent COMESA Investment – 
which has not entered into force– and the SADC Model BIT – which has not 
104   Pantechniki SA Contractors & Engineers v The Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No 
ARB/07/21, Award (30 July 2009) para 77.
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yet been used in practice –, a specific understanding of FET and FPS is not 
noticeable from the treaty text or from the arbitral practice.
This article finally has shown that in line with Article 14 (3) of the COMESA 
Investment Agreement which contains a provision to the effect that FET is 
made dependent on the level of development of the host State, FET and FPS 
may at any rate be interpreted and applied differently not in African States 
specifically, but in developing States more generally. Indeed, in relation to FET, 
I have argued that the legitimate expectations of foreign investors differ ac-
cording to whether the investment is made in a developed or a developing 
State, and that as a consequence the application of the FET standard is linked 
to the specific level of development of the host State. In relation to FPS, I have 
argued that the due diligence standard used to assess whether the host State 
has taken all necessary measures to provide physical and security protection to 
the foreign investor from harm caused by third parties is the subjective diligen-
tia quam in suis standard. This standard implies that variations in the wealth 
between States and the level of development of the States can be taken into 
account.
